| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29515 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29515 |
| An Economic Model of Consensus on Distributed Ledgers | |
| Hanna Halaburda; Zhiguo He; Jiasun Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In recent years, the designs of many new blockchain applications have been inspired by the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) problem. While traditional BFT protocols assume that most system nodes are honest (in that they follow the protocol), we recognize that blockchains are deployed in environments where nodes are subject to strategic incentives. This paper develops an economic framework for analyzing such cases. Specifically, we assume that 1) non-Byzantine nodes are rational, so we explicitly study their incentives when participating in a BFT consensus process; 2) non-Byzantine nodes are ambiguity averse, and specifically, Knightian uncertain about Byzantine actions; and 3) decisions/inferences are all based on local information. We thus obtain a consensus game with preplay communications. We characterize all equilibria, some of which feature rational leaders withholding messages from some nodes in order to achieve consensus. These findings enrich those from traditional BFT algorithms, where an honest leader always sends messages to all nodes. We also study how the progress of communication technology (i.e., potential message losses) affects the equilibrium consensus outcome. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29515 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587189 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hanna Halaburda,Zhiguo He,Jiasun Li. An Economic Model of Consensus on Distributed Ledgers. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29515.pdf（651KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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