| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29557 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29557 |
| Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study | |
| Pëllumb Reshidi; Alessandro Lizzeri; Leeat Yariv; Jimmy H. Chan; Wing Suen | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such information-collection processes. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. We also contrast static information collection, as in classical hypothesis testing, with dynamic collection, as in sequential hypothesis testing. Several insights emerge. Static information collection is excessive, and sequential information collection is non-stationary, producing declining decision accuracies over time. Furthermore, groups using majority rule yield especially hasty and inaccurate decisions. Nonetheless, sequential information collection is welfare enhancing relative to static collection, particularly when unanimous rules are used. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29557 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587231 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pëllumb Reshidi,Alessandro Lizzeri,Leeat Yariv,et al. Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29557.pdf（4770KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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