全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w29560
来源ID	Working Paper 29560
	Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum
	Thomas Philippon; Olivier Wang
发表日期	2021-12-13
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We study time-consistent bank resolution mechanisms. When interventions are ex post efficient, a government cannot commit not to inject capital into the banking system. Contrary to common wisdom, we show that the government may still avoid moral hazard and implement the first best allocation by using the distribution of bailouts across banks to provide ex ante incentives. In particular, we analyze properties of credible tournament mechanisms that provide support to the best performing banks and resolve the worst performing ones, including through mergers. Our mechanism continues to perform well if banks are partially substitutable, and if they are heterogeneous in their size, interconnections, and thus systemic risk, as long as bailout funds can be targeted to particular banks.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w29560
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587234
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Thomas Philippon,Olivier Wang. Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum. 2021.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w29560.pdf（841KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览