| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29586 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29586 |
| Inattention and Inequity in School Matching | |
| Stefan F. Bucher; Andrew Caplin | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The attractive properties of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm rest on the assumption of perfect information. Yet field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model costly strategic learning when schools are ex ante symmetric, agree on their ranking of students, and learning is rationally inattentive. Our analytic solution quantifies how each student’s rank, learning costs and prior beliefs interact to determine their gross and net welfare as well as the extent and form of mistakes they make. In line with the evidence, we find that lower-ranked students are affected disproportionately more by information costs, generally suffering a larger welfare loss than higher-ranked students. Interactions between mechanism design, inattention and inequity are thus of first order importance. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29586 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587260 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefan F. Bucher,Andrew Caplin. Inattention and Inequity in School Matching. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29586.pdf（853KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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