| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29606 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29606 |
| Zombie Lending and Policy Traps | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Simone Lenzu; Olivier Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-12-27 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We build a model with heterogeneous firms and banks to analyze how policy affects credit allocation and long-term economic outcomes. When firms are hit by small negative shocks, conventional monetary policy can restore efficient bank lending and production by lowering interest rates. Large shocks, however, necessitate unconventional policy such as regulatory forbearance towards banks to stabilize the economy. Aggressive accommodation runs the risk of introducing zombie lending and a “diabolical sorting”, whereby low-capitalization banks extend new credit or evergreen existing loans to low-productivity firms. If shocks reduce the profitability gap between healthy and zombie firms, the optimal forbearance policy is non-monotone in the size of the shock. In a dynamic setting, policy aimed at avoiding short-term recessions can be trapped into protracted low rates and excessive forbearance, due to congestion externalities imposed by zombie lending on healthier firms. The resulting economic sclerosis delays the recovery from transitory shocks, and can even lead to permanent output losses. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29606 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Simone Lenzu,Olivier Wang. Zombie Lending and Policy Traps. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29606.pdf（912KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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