| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29625 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29625 |
| Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach | |
| Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Juan M. Ortner; Sylvain Chassang | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions in which the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting non-competitive environments. We apply our tests to two datasets: the sample of Ohio milk auctions studied in Porter and Zona (1999), and a sample of municipal procurement auctions from Japan. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29625 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587298 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,Juan M. Ortner,et al. Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29625.pdf（843KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
