| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29627 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29627 |
| Revealing Corruption: Firm and Worker Level Evidence from Brazil | |
| Emanuele Colonnelli; Spyridon Lagaras; Jacopo Ponticelli; Mounu Prem; Margarita Tsoutsoura | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how the disclosure of corrupt practices affects the growth of firms involved in illegal interactions with the government using randomized audits of public procurement in Brazil. On average, firms exposed by the anti-corruption program grow larger after the audits, despite experiencing a decrease in procurement contracts. We manually collect new data on the details of thousands of corruption cases, through which we uncover a large heterogeneity in our firm-level effects depending on the degree of involvement in corruption cases. Using investment-, loan-, and worker- level data, we show that the average exposed firms adapt to the loss of government contracts by changing their investment strategy. They increase capital investment and borrow more to finance such investment, while there is no change in their internal organization. We provide qualitative support to our results by conducting new face-to-face surveys with business owners of government-dependent firms. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29627 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587300 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emanuele Colonnelli,Spyridon Lagaras,Jacopo Ponticelli,et al. Revealing Corruption: Firm and Worker Level Evidence from Brazil. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29627.pdf（620KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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