| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29636 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29636 |
| Information versus Investment | |
| Stephen J. Terry; Toni M. Whited; Anastasia A. Zakolyukina | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm managers confront realistic incentives to misreport earnings and distort their real investment choices. The model implies a socially optimal level of disclosure regulation that exceeds the estimated value. Counterfactual analysis reveals that eliminating earnings misreporting completely through disclosure regulation incentivizes managers to distort real investment. Lower earnings informativeness raises the cost of capital, which results in a 5.7% drop in average firm value, but more modest effects on social welfare and aggregate growth. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29636 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587309 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen J. Terry,Toni M. Whited,Anastasia A. Zakolyukina. Information versus Investment. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29636.pdf（751KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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