G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w29636
来源IDWorking Paper 29636
Information versus Investment
Stephen J. Terry; Toni M. Whited; Anastasia A. Zakolyukina
发表日期2022-01-10
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm managers confront realistic incentives to misreport earnings and distort their real investment choices. The model implies a socially optimal level of disclosure regulation that exceeds the estimated value. Counterfactual analysis reveals that eliminating earnings misreporting completely through disclosure regulation incentivizes managers to distort real investment. Lower earnings informativeness raises the cost of capital, which results in a 5.7% drop in average firm value, but more modest effects on social welfare and aggregate growth.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w29636
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587309
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GB/T 7714
Stephen J. Terry,Toni M. Whited,Anastasia A. Zakolyukina. Information versus Investment. 2022.
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