| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29655 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29655 |
| A New Era of Midnight Mergers: Antitrust Risk and Investor Disclosures | |
| John M. Barrios; Thomas G. Wollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anticompetitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise escape scrutiny, creating disincentives for managers to divulge transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we estimate a regression discontinuity that exploits mandatory disclosure thresholds stipulated by securities law. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we present a method for measuring undisclosed merger activity that relies on financial accounting reporting requirements. We find that undisclosed mergers total $2.3 trillion between 2002 and 2016. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29655 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587329 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John M. Barrios,Thomas G. Wollmann. A New Era of Midnight Mergers: Antitrust Risk and Investor Disclosures. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29655.pdf（497KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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