| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29662 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29662 |
| Minimum Wages, Efficiency and Welfare | |
| David W. Berger; Kyle F. Herkenhoff; Simon Mongey | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It has long been argued that a minimum wage could alleviate efficiency losses from monopsony power. In a general equilibrium framework that quantitatively replicates results from recent empirical studies, we find higher minimum wages can improve welfare, but most welfare gains stem from redistribution rather than efficiency. Our model features oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms and yields analytical expressions that characterize the mechanisms by which minimum wages can improve efficiency, and how these deteriorate at higher minimum wages. We provide a method to separate welfare gains into two channels: efficiency and redistribution. Under both channels and Utilitarian social welfare weights the optimal minimum wage is $15, but alternative weights can rationalize anything from $0 to $31. Under only the efficiency channel, the optimal minimum wage is narrowly around $8, robust to social welfare weights, and generates small welfare gains that recover only 2 percent of the efficiency losses from monopsony power. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29662 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587336 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David W. Berger,Kyle F. Herkenhoff,Simon Mongey. Minimum Wages, Efficiency and Welfare. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29662.pdf（5156KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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