| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29673 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29673 |
| Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency and Intentional Ambiguity | |
| Chengcheng Jia; Jing Cynthia Wu | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the implications of the Fed’s new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. The central bank has the incentive to deviate from its announced AIT and implement inflation targeting ex post to maximize social welfare. We show two motives for ambiguous communication about the horizon over which the central bank averages inflation as a result of time inconsistency. First, it is optimal for the central bank to announce different horizons depending on the state of the economy. Second, ambiguous communication helps the central bank gain credibility. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Monetary Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29673 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587347 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chengcheng Jia,Jing Cynthia Wu. Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency and Intentional Ambiguity. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29673.pdf（533KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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