| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29728 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29728 |
| Teacher Labor Market Equilibrium and the Distribution of Student Achievement | |
| Michael D. Bates; Michael Dinerstein; Andrew C. Johnston; Isaac Sorkin | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the equity and efficiency consequences of the allocation of teachers to schools. Within a district, wages are uniform across potential assignments. Because teachers tend to prefer schools with more advantaged students, this uniformity may lead to inequity among students. Because there might be match effects in teaching, this uniformity may lead to inefficient allocations. While we do observe inefficient allocations (there are meaningful gains from reallocation), surprisingly, we do not observe inequity: advantaged and disadvantaged students have teachers with similar value-added. To understand why uniform wages lead to inefficiency but not inequity, we use rich data from the teacher transfer system linked to test score data to estimate an equilibrium model of the teacher labor market. We find that the allocation is equitable because principals hire noisily, tending not to select their most effective applicants. Achieving most efficiency gains, however, requires differentiated wages that compensate teachers for match output. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29728 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587402 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Bates,Michael Dinerstein,Andrew C. Johnston,et al. Teacher Labor Market Equilibrium and the Distribution of Student Achievement. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29728.pdf（1648KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
