| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29753 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29753 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? | |
| Kristian Blickle; Markus K. Brunnermeier; Stephan Luck | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and non-financial wholesale deposits from both ex-post failing and surviving banks. This implies that regular depositors are unable to identify failing banks. In contrast, the interbank market precisely identifies which banks will fail: the interbank market collapses for failing banks entirely but continues to function for surviving banks, which can borrow from other banks in response to deposit outflows. Since regular depositors appear uninformed, we argue that it is unlikely that deposit insurance would exacerbate moral hazard. Instead, interbank depositors are best positioned for providing “discipline” via short-term funding. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29753 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587427 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kristian Blickle,Markus K. Brunnermeier,Stephan Luck. Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29753.pdf（2468KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
