| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29759 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29759 |
| Group Corruption via Sequential Bargaining in a Hierarchical Organization | |
| Fan-chin Kung; Ping Wang; Quan Wen | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a framework of group corruption via back-door negotiations between an outside initiator and an authority of decision-makers in a hierarchical organization. We examine the role played by the architecture of a multi-tier authority and determine under such a structure how bargaining proceeds, in what order, and when it breaks down. We verify that equilibrium bargaining sequence proceeds as a chain through decision-making agents, regardless of the hierarchy of the organization. We prove the existence of a compromised equilibrium, where the decision of the authority is compromised, and establish sufficient conditions under which the most natural bottom-up bargaining configuration arises in equilibrium where a proposer negotiates with an immediately higher ranked respondent, starting with the initiator bargaining with the lowest ranked decision-maker in the organization. We then show the circumstances under which a top-down or a non-monotonic equilibrium configuration may emerge, and those under which the deal may break down. This enables us to capture a rich array of group corruptive configurations as observed. We conclude by investigating the extension to multi-tier authorities with multiple agents of the same rank in each tier, such as in a tree hierarchy. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29759 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587433 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fan-chin Kung,Ping Wang,Quan Wen. Group Corruption via Sequential Bargaining in a Hierarchical Organization. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29759.pdf（269KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
