| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29775 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29775 |
| What Gets Measured Gets Managed: Investment and the Cost of Capital | |
| Zhiguo He; Guanmin Liao; Baolian Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the impact of government-led incentive systems by examining a staggered reform in the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) performance evaluation policy. To improve capital allocative efficiency, in 2010, regulators switched from using return on equity (ROE) to economic value added (EVA) when evaluating SOE performance. This EVA policy adopts a one-size-fits-all approach by stipulating a fixed cost of capital for virtually all SOEs, ignoring the potential heterogeneity of firm-specific costs of capital. We show that SOEs did respond to the performance evaluation reform by altering their investment decisions, more so when the actual borrowing rate was further away from the stipulated cost of capital. Our paper provides causal evidence that incentive schemes affect real investment and sheds new light on challenges faced by economic reforms in China. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29775 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587449 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhiguo He,Guanmin Liao,Baolian Wang. What Gets Measured Gets Managed: Investment and the Cost of Capital. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29775.pdf（1417KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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