| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29797 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29797 |
| Democratization, Elite Capture and Economic Development | |
| Andrew D. Foster; Mark R. Rosenzweig | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show using a theoretical framework that embeds a voting model in a general-equilibrium model of a rural economy with two interest groups defined by land ownership that the effects of democratization—a shift from control of public resources by the landed elite to a democratic regime with universal suffrage—on the portfolio of public goods is heterogeneous, depending the population landless. In accord with the model and empirical findings from micro data on the differing material interests of the two land classes, we find, based on 30-year panel data describing the democratization of Indian villages, that democratization in villages with a larger landless population share shifted resources away from public irrigation, secondary schools, and electrification and towards programs that increase employment. When the landed farmers have a large population share, public resources were shifted towards irrigation, secondary schools and electrification and away from employment programs. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29797 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587471 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew D. Foster,Mark R. Rosenzweig. Democratization, Elite Capture and Economic Development. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29797.pdf（596KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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