| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29805 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29805 |
| The Impact of Campaign Finance Rules on Candidate Selection and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from France | |
| Nikolaj Broberg; Vincent Pons; Clemence Tricaud | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French departmental and municipal elections, candidates competing in districts above 9,000 inhabitants face spending limits and are eligible for public reimbursement if they obtain more than five percent of the votes. Using an RDD around the population threshold, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates, in departmental elections, while leaving the polarization and representativeness of the results unaffected. Incumbents are less likely to get reelected because they are less likely to run and obtain a lower vote share, conditional on running. These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures, not spending limits. We do not find such effects in municipal elections, which we attribute to the use of a proportional list system instead of plurality voting. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29805 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587479 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nikolaj Broberg,Vincent Pons,Clemence Tricaud. The Impact of Campaign Finance Rules on Candidate Selection and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from France. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29805.pdf（692KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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