| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29807 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29807 |
| Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market | |
| Levent Altinoglu; Joseph E. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The concentration of risk within the financial system leads to systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions when the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing interbank claims, risky institutions endogenously become too interconnected to fail. This concentrated structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crises in a privately optimal way, but leads to excessive risk taking even by peripheral institutions. Interconnectedness and excessive risk taking reinforce one another. Macroprudential regulation which limits the interconnectedness of risky institutions improves welfare. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29807 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587481 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Levent Altinoglu,Joseph E. Stiglitz. Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29807.pdf（445KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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