| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29846 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29846 |
| Allocating Scarce Information | |
| Richard T. Holden; Anup Malani; Chris Teh | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sender conveys scarce information to a number of receivers to maximize the sum of receiver payoffs. Each receiver’s payoff depends on the state of the world and an action she takes. The optimal action is state contingent. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that the payoff of each receiver is convex in the amount of information she receives. Thus, it is optimal for Sender to target information to a single receiver. We then study four extensions in which interior information allocations are optimal. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29846 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587518 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard T. Holden,Anup Malani,Chris Teh. Allocating Scarce Information. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29846.pdf（1163KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
