| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29859 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29859 |
| Syndicated Lending, Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation | |
| Thomas Schneider; Philip Strahan; Jun Yang | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks’ willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks which are more frequently named in RPE hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers face higher spreads. These banks, in turn, lose market share to banks less likely to be named in RPE. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29859 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587530 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Schneider,Philip Strahan,Jun Yang. Syndicated Lending, Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29859.pdf（831KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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