| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w29869
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 29869
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| Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA |
| Pietro Tebaldi
|
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-28
|
| 出版年 | 2022
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In government-sponsored health insurance, subsidy design affects market outcomes. First, holding premiums fixed, subsidies determine insurance uptake and average cost. Insurers then respond to these changes, adjusting premiums. Combining data from the first four years of the California ACA marketplace with a model of insurance demand, cost, and insurers’ competition, I quantify the impact of alternative subsidy designs on premiums, enrollment, costs, public spending, and consumer surplus. Younger individuals are more price sensitive and cheaper to cover. Increasing subsidies to this group would make all buyers better off, increase market participation, and lower average costs and average subsidies. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare
; Health
; Industrial Organization
; Industry Studies
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29869
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587541
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pietro Tebaldi. Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA. 2022.
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|
文件名：
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w29869.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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