| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29886 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29886 |
| Does Entry Remedy Collusion? Evidence from the Generic Prescription Drug Cartel | |
| Amanda Starc; Thomas G. Wollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Entry represents a fundamental threat to cartels engaged in price fixing. We study the extent and effect of this behavior in the largest price fixing case in US history, which involves generic drugmakers. To do so, we link information on the cartel’s internal operations to regulatory filings and market data. We find that collusion induces significant entry, which in turn reduces prices. However, regulatory approvals delay most entrants by 2-4 years. We then estimate a structural model to assess counterfactual policies. We find that reducing regulatory delays by just 1-2 years equates to consumer compensating variation of $597 million-$1.52 billion. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29886 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587558 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amanda Starc,Thomas G. Wollmann. Does Entry Remedy Collusion? Evidence from the Generic Prescription Drug Cartel. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29886.pdf（518KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
