| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29888 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29888 |
| High-Yield Debt Covenants and Their Real Effects | |
| Falk Bräuning; Victoria Ivashina; Ali Ozdagli | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | High-yield debt including leveraged loans is characterized by incurrence financial covenants, or “cov-lite” provisions. A traditional loan agreement includes maintenance covenants, which require continuous compliance with the covenant threshold, and their violation shifts the control rights to creditors. Incurrence covenants preserve equity control rights but trigger pre-specified restrictions on the borrower’s actions once the covenant threshold is crossed. We show that the prevalence of incurrence covenants indirectly imposes significant constraints on investments as restricted actions become binding: Similar to the effects associated with the shift of control rights to creditors in traditional loans, the drop in investment under incurrence covenants is large and sudden. The deleveraging and drop in investment and market value associated with such latent violations point to a shock amplification mechanism through contractual restrictions that are at play for a highly levered corporate sector prior to firms filing for bankruptcy and independently of whether they ever do so. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29888 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587560 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Falk Bräuning,Victoria Ivashina,Ali Ozdagli. High-Yield Debt Covenants and Their Real Effects. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29888.pdf（805KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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