| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29892 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29892 |
| Reinsuring the Insurers of Last Resort | |
| David Dranove; Craig Garthwaite; Christopher Ody | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Hospitals face large and variable costs from treating indigent care patients. Two methods of “reinsuring” hospitals against these costs are providing these patients with insurance and directly providing hospitals with supplemental payments to cover the expected costs of treating the indigent. Currently, the U.S. uses a hybrid of these approaches, insuring some indigent patients through Medicaid and providing hospitals with supplemental payments through programs such as Medicaid Disproportionate Share. We evaluate the economic fundamentals of supplemental payments in the U.S. safety net. We find that providing indigent care patients with insurance and providing hospitals with supplement payments are imperfect substitutes to hospitals because they differ in the extent to which they protect hospitals from risk, incentivize cost control, and and incentivize certain investments. Overall, we find that supplemental payments are used to increase access to hospitals in areas with many indigent patients, rather than to provide efficient intertemporal risk-protection to hospitals or incentivize cost control. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29892 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587564 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Dranove,Craig Garthwaite,Christopher Ody. Reinsuring the Insurers of Last Resort. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29892.pdf（1147KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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