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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w29975
来源IDWorking Paper 29975
The New Corporate Governance
Oliver D. Hart; Luigi Zingales
发表日期2022-04-25
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要In the last few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues. In some cases shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value. It is hard to understand this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm based on shareholder value maximization. We explain how jurisprudence has sustained this criterion in spite of its economic weaknesses. To overcome these weaknesses we propose the criterion of shareholder welfare maximization and argue that it can better explain observed behavior. Finally, we outline how shareholder welfare maximization can be implemented in practice.
主题Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w29975
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587649
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GB/T 7714
Oliver D. Hart,Luigi Zingales. The New Corporate Governance. 2022.
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