| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29981 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29981 |
| The Design of Defined Contribution Plans | |
| Vivek Bhattacharya; Gastón Illanes | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Defined contribution (DC) plans are a major vehicle for retirement savings in the US, holding almost $10 trillion in assets under management. In recent years, the quality and availability of these plans has been the subject of active policy attention and of several major lawsuits. This paper studies how employers and plan providers (recordkeepers) design these plans. We argue that low plan quality and limited provision can come from two sources. First, employer willingness to pay may be misaligned with that of workers or of regulators. Second, the market for recordkeeping may be imperfectly competitive. We propose a model of plan design and estimate that while both frictions are at play, significant changes to plan quality require modifying employer preferences. Accordingly, we evaluate proposed policies and conclude that only direct quality regulation can lead to significant quality improvements. Recent proposals can increase plan provision but have negligible quality effects. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29981 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587654 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vivek Bhattacharya,Gastón Illanes. The Design of Defined Contribution Plans. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29981.pdf（410KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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