Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w29984 |
来源ID | Working Paper 29984 |
Collective Hold-Up | |
Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros | |
发表日期 | 2022-05-02 |
出版年 | 2022 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a firm seeking the approval of corrupt bureaucrats. We show that when the principal’s willingness to pay is high, strengthening the bargaining position of the agents generates delay and reduces agents’ welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents prefer to give up considerable bargaining power in favor of the principal. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29984 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587657 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matias Iaryczower,Santiago Oliveros. Collective Hold-Up. 2022. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w29984.pdf(557KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。