G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w29984
来源IDWorking Paper 29984
Collective Hold-Up
Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros
发表日期2022-05-02
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a firm seeking the approval of corrupt bureaucrats. We show that when the principal’s willingness to pay is high, strengthening the bargaining position of the agents generates delay and reduces agents’ welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents prefer to give up considerable bargaining power in favor of the principal.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w29984
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587657
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Matias Iaryczower,Santiago Oliveros. Collective Hold-Up. 2022.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w29984.pdf(557KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Matias Iaryczower]的文章
[Santiago Oliveros]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Matias Iaryczower]的文章
[Santiago Oliveros]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Matias Iaryczower]的文章
[Santiago Oliveros]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w29984.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。