| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29991 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29991 |
| Property Rights in Historical Political Economy: When do Wedges Wither? | |
| Lee J. Alston; Bernardo Mueller | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Countries are not equally developed in large part because most countries face sets of property rights that do not foster growth despite the aggregate gains that would result from changing property rights. The difference in rents to society between the extant set of property rights and some seemingly better alternative we define as a “Demsetz” wedge. We explore the forces that sustain the status quo as well the forces that prompt property rights to change. |
| 主题 | History ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29991 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587664 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lee J. Alston,Bernardo Mueller. Property Rights in Historical Political Economy: When do Wedges Wither?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29991.pdf（206KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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