| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30032 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30032 |
| Do Sell-Side Analysts Say \u201cBuy\u201d While Whispering \u201cSell\u201d? | |
| David Hirshleifer; Yushui Shi; Weili Wu | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-16 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30032 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587706 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Hirshleifer,Yushui Shi,Weili Wu. Do Sell-Side Analysts Say \u201cBuy\u201d While Whispering \u201cSell\u201d?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30032.pdf（1091KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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