全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w30065
来源ID	Working Paper 30065
	Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
	Florian Ederer; Weicheng Min
发表日期	2022-05-23
出版年	2022
语种	英语
摘要	How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as this probability is sufficiently small, the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the presence of lie detection because the Sender simply compensates by lying more. However, when the lie detection probability is sufficiently high, the Sender's equilibrium payoff decreases and the Receiver's equilibrium payoff increases with the lie detection probability.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w30065
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587739
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Florian Ederer,Weicheng Min. Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection. 2022.