| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30131 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30131 |
| Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Cecilia Parlatore; Suresh Sundaresan | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments have limited financial commitment and can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing involves government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to commit not to expropriate which improves private sector incentives and project quality. The model captures several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing such as government co-investment, tax subsidies, development rights, and cross-guarantees. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30131 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587803 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Cecilia Parlatore,Suresh Sundaresan. Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30131.pdf（364KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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