| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30150 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30150 |
| Strategic Real Option Exercising and Second-mover Advantage | |
| Min Dai; Zhaoli Jiang; Neng Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many business opportunities feature second-mover advantages as there are often positive spillovers and externalities from early entrants to followers. We develop a tractable stochastic duopoly entry game with a second-mover advantage. We show that firms engage in a war-of-attrition game with the hope of becoming the follower, resulting in excessively delayed entry opposite to the predictions that competition causes firms to equalize rents (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) by exercising their entry options too soon (Grenadier, 1996). We obtain closed-form value functions and entry strategies for both mixed-strategy and pure-strategy equilibria. We develop a separation principle that a.) decomposes the duopoly game into a monopolist's problem and a generalized war-of-attrition game with stochastic payoffs; and b.) connects the mixed- strategy and pure-strategy equilibria. Quantitatively, our model predicts substantial option value erosion caused by inefficiently delayed firm entry. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30150 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587822 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Min Dai,Zhaoli Jiang,Neng Wang. Strategic Real Option Exercising and Second-mover Advantage. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30150.pdf（980KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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