| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w30151
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 30151
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| Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model |
| Ashley C. Craig; Joel Slemrod
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| 发表日期 | 2022-06-13
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| 出版年 | 2022
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We provide a unified analysis of taxation and taxpayer education when individuals have an incomplete understanding of a complex tax system. The analysis is independent of whether income is earned legitimately, or by avoiding or evading taxes. In this sense, learning about tax minimization strategies (tax manipulation) is isomorphic to learning about tax rates. The government in our model balances a trade-off: A better understanding of the tax system potentially allows taxpayers to optimize more effectively, but also affects government revenue. Optimal taxpayer education and the optimal amount of redistribution can both be characterized by aggregate sufficient statistics, which do not require information about how biases or behavioral responses vary across the decision margins. We provide similarly simple rules for how tax rates on different income-generating activities should be set relative to each other. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30151
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587823
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ashley C. Craig,Joel Slemrod. Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model. 2022.
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文件名：
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w30151.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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