| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30166 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30166 |
| Fighting Communism Supporting Collusion | |
| Sebastian Galiani; Jose Manuel Paz y Miño; Gustavo Torrens | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a simple model to explain why a powerful importer country like the United States may provide political support for international collusive agreements concerning certain commodities (e.g., coffee). This behavior raises questions due to the fact that an importer country should have strong economic incentives to avoid the cartelization of its suppliers. We show that an importer country sometimes helps producer countries organize and enforce collusion to advance important geopolitical goals, e.g., by reducing the chances that the producer countries will align with a rival global power (e.g., the Soviet Union). Moreover, using this practice, a powerful importer country can immediately share the cost of collusion with other importers (including allies). Thus, a powerful importer country may see collusion as a superior strategy to foreign aid (a priori a more direct and efficient instrument), which is riddled with free riding problems. The model sheds light on why the United States supported (or failed to support) international commodity agreements for coffee, sugar, and oil during and immediately after the Cold War period. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Globalization and International Relations ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30166 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587840 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Galiani,Jose Manuel Paz y Miño,Gustavo Torrens. Fighting Communism Supporting Collusion. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30166.pdf（499KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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