| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30189 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30189 |
| Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus | |
| Joshua S. Gans; Richard T. Holden | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks. However, this procedure can still lead to potential attacks that make consensus harder to achieve or lead to coordination issues if multiple, competing chains (i.e., forks) are created with the potential that an untruthful fork might be selected. We explore the potential for mechanisms to be used to achieve consensus that are triggered when there is a dispute impeding consensus. Using the feature that nodes stake tokens in proof of stake (POS) protocols, we construct revelation mechanisms in which the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium involves validating nodes propose truthful blocks using only the information that exists amongst all nodes. We construct operationally and computationally simple mechanisms under both Byzantine Fault Tolerance and a Longest Chain Rule, and discuss their robustness to attacks. Our perspective is that the use of simple mechanisms is an unexplored area of blockchain consensus and has the potential to mitigate known trade-offs and enhance scalability. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30189 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587862 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua S. Gans,Richard T. Holden. Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30189.pdf（305KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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