| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30193 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30193 |
| Price Setting with Strategic Complementarities as a Mean Field Game | |
| Fernando E. Alvarez; Francesco Lippi; Takis Souganidis | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the propagation of monetary shocks in a sticky-price general-equilibrium economy where the firms’ pricing strategy feature a complementarity with the decisions of other firms. In a dynamic equilibrium the firm’s price-setting decisions depend on aggregates, which in turn depend on firms’ decisions. We cast this fixed-point problem as a Mean Field Game and establish several analytic results. We study existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize the impulse response function (IRF) of output following an aggregate “MIT” shock. We prove that strategic complementarities make the IRF larger at each horizon, in a convex fashion. We establish that complementarities may give rise to an IRF with a hump-shaped profile. As the complementarity becomes large enough the IRF diverges and at a critical point there is no equilibrium. Finally, we show that the amplification effect of the strategic interactions is similar across models. For instance, the Calvo model and the Golosov-Lucas model display a comparable amplification, in spite of the fact that the non-neutrality in Calvo is much larger. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30193 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587866 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fernando E. Alvarez,Francesco Lippi,Takis Souganidis. Price Setting with Strategic Complementarities as a Mean Field Game. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30193.pdf（1234KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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