| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30213 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30213 |
| Can Fiscal Externalities Be Internalized? | |
| Erzo F.P. Luttmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Subsidies and in-kind transfers give rise to negative fiscal externalities. However, internalizing negative fiscal externalities through taxation would undo the subsidy or in-kind transfer that caused them. Similarly, positive fiscal externalities cannot be internalized though government subsidies. This paper describes a mechanism that transfers fiscal externalities from the government to private parties. Such transfers generate incentives within the private sector to reduce inefficiencies caused by fiscal externalities. Thus, the paper offers a straightforward, but powerful, insight: transferring fiscal externalities to third parties extends the reach of the Coase Theorem to inefficiencies stemming from fiscal externalities. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30213 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587885 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erzo F.P. Luttmer. Can Fiscal Externalities Be Internalized?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30213.pdf（117KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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