| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30219 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30219 |
| Screening Adaptive Cartels | |
| Juan M. Ortner; Sylvain Chassang; Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30219 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587891 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan M. Ortner,Sylvain Chassang,Kei Kawai,et al. Screening Adaptive Cartels. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30219.pdf（507KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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