| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30220 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30220 |
| Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions | |
| Kala Krishna; Sergey Lychagin; Wojciech Olszewski; Ron Siegel; Chloe Tergiman | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | College admissions in many countries are based on a centrally administered test. Applicants invest a great deal of resources to improve their performance on the test, and there is growing concern about the large costs associated with these activities. We consider modifying such tests by introducing performance-disclosure policies that pool intervals of performance rankings, and investigate how such policies can improve students’ welfare in a Pareto sense. Pooling affects the equilibrium allocation of studentso colleges, which hurts some students and benefits others, but also affects the effort students exert. We characterize the Pareto frontier of Pareto improving policies, and also identify improvements that are robust to the distribution of college seats. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30220 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587892 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kala Krishna,Sergey Lychagin,Wojciech Olszewski,et al. Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30220.pdf（1432KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
