全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w30257
来源ID	Working Paper 30257
	Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms
	Adam Kapor; Mohit Karnani; Christopher Neilson
发表日期	2022-07-18
出版年	2022
语种	英语
摘要	We study the welfare and human-capital impacts of the configuration of on- and off-platform options in the context of Chile’s centralized higher education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: an expansion of the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40% and the introduction of a large scholarship program. We first show that more programs’ joining the platform led students to start college sooner and raised the share of students who graduated on time. We then develop a model of college applications, offers, waitlists, and matriculation choices, which we estimate using students’ ranked-ordered applications, on- and off-platform enrollment, and on-time graduation outcomes. When more programs join the platform, welfare increases, and the extent of aftermarket frictions matters less for welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates. High-SES students have greater access to off-platform options, and gains from platform expansion are larger for students from lower-SES backgrounds. Our results indicate that expanding the scope of a higher education platform can have real impacts on welfare and human capital.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Industrial Organization
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w30257
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587929
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Adam Kapor,Mohit Karnani,Christopher Neilson. Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms. 2022.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w30257.pdf（650KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览