| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30271 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30271 |
| A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California | |
| Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Daichi Shimamoto | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-25 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Development and Growth ; Country Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30271 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587944 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,Daichi Shimamoto. A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30271.pdf（869KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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