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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w30271
来源IDWorking Paper 30271
A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California
Kei Kawai; Jun Nakabayashi; Daichi Shimamoto
发表日期2022-07-25
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries.
主题Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Development and Growth ; Country Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w30271
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587944
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Kei Kawai,Jun Nakabayashi,Daichi Shimamoto. A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California. 2022.
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