| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30283 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30283 |
| Adverse Selection as a Policy Instrument: Unraveling Climate Change | |
| Steve Cicala; David Hémous; Morten G. Olsen | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-25 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper applies principles of adverse selection to overcome obstacles that prevent the implementation of Pigouvian policies to internalize externalities. Focusing on negative externalities from production (such as pollution), we consider settings in which aggregate emissions are known, but individual contributions are unobserved by the government. We evaluate a policy that gives firms the option to pay a tax on their voluntarily and verifiably disclosed emissions, or pay an output tax based on the average rate of emissions among the undisclosed firms. The certification of relatively clean firms raises the output-based tax, setting off a process of unraveling in favor of disclosure. We derive sufficient statistics formulas to calculate the welfare of such a program relative to mandatory output or emissions taxes. We find that the voluntary certification mechanism would deliver significant gains over output-based taxation in two empirical applications: methane emissions from oil and gas fields, and carbon emissions from imported steel. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30283 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587956 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steve Cicala,David Hémous,Morten G. Olsen. Adverse Selection as a Policy Instrument: Unraveling Climate Change. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30283.pdf（930KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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