| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30325 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30325 |
| Quality Regulation and Competition: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets | |
| Juan Pablo Atal; José Ignacio Cuesta; Morten Sæthre | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Quality regulation attempts to ensure quality and foster competition by reducing vertical differentiation, but it may also have adverse effects on market structure. We study this trade-off in the context of pharmaceutical bioequivalence, which is the primary quality standard for generic drugs. Exploiting the introduction of bioequivalence in Chile, we find that stronger regulation decreased the number of drugs in the market by 21% and increased average paid prices by 13%. We estimate a model of drug entry, certification, and demand to study the role of drug quality, aversion against generics, and certification costs in shaping the equilibrium effects of quality regulation. We find that quality regulation increased demand for generic drugs by resolving asymmetric information and reducing aversion against unbranded generics, which induced entry of high-quality drugs in place of low-quality drugs. Consumer welfare increased despite higher prices and a lower number of firms. We compare minimum quality standards to quality disclosure and other designs of quality regulation. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30325 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587998 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Pablo Atal,José Ignacio Cuesta,Morten Sæthre. Quality Regulation and Competition: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30325.pdf（1084KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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