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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w30326
来源IDWorking Paper 30326
The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States
Filippo Lancieri; Eric A. Posner; Luigi Zingales
发表日期2022-08-08
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes.
主题Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Economic Systems
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w30326
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587999
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Filippo Lancieri,Eric A. Posner,Luigi Zingales. The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States. 2022.
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