| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30326 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30326 |
| The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States | |
| Filippo Lancieri; Eric A. Posner; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30326 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587999 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Filippo Lancieri,Eric A. Posner,Luigi Zingales. The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30326.pdf（1151KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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