| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem | |
| Joshua Blonz | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I measure the welfare costs of the principal-agent problem in the context of an energy efficiency appliance upgrade program. I find that the principal-agent problem turns an otherwise welfare-increasing program into a welfare-reducing program. |
| 主题 | Policy Design and Evaluation,Energy Efficiency and Demand-Side Management,Data and Decision Tools,Electric Power |
| URL | https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/the-welfare-costs-of-misaligned-incentives-energy-inefficiency-and-the-principal-agent-problem/ |
| 来源智库 | Resources for the Future (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/588132 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Blonz. The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| RFF_WP_18-28.pdf（419KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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