| 来源类型 | Journal Article |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods | |
| Matthew Wibbenmeyer; Sarah E. Anderson; Andrew J. Plantinga | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines how behavioral biases caused by salient events affect the government provision of public goods. We develop a theory in which competing communities lobby the government for allocations of a local public good. Salient events bias community demands for the good, which results in inefficient allocations. We empirically test this theory using salient wildfires and government projects to reduce wildfire risk. Wildfires reduce risk to nearby communities, but may increase demand for fuels management projects because of biases induced by salient wildfires. We find that communities experiencing recent nearby fires are more likely to receive fuels management projects. (JEL D03, H41, Q24) |
| 主题 | Wildfires |
| URL | https://www.rff.org/publications/journal-articles/salience-and-government-provision-public-goods/ |
| 来源智库 | Resources for the Future (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/588173 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Wibbenmeyer,Sarah E. Anderson,Andrew J. Plantinga. Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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