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来源类型 | CEPS Policy Briefs |
规范类型 | 简报 |
Winners and Losers under Various Dual-Majority Voting Rules for the EU's Council of Ministers | |
Richard Baldwin; Editor-in-Chief of Vox.eu.org; Mika Widgren | |
发表日期 | 2004-04-01 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | It has long been known that enlargement would have dramatic implications for EU decision-making: a structure designed for six would simply collapse under the weight of 25 or more members. This is why EU leaders have been searching for a viable voting-system reform, which will be discussed again in June 2004. This policy brief studies the many options facing EU leaders. Using the Normalised Banzhaf Index, it provides quantitative estimates of the decision-making efficiency and distributions of power for the various schemes proposed. Insight is offered on how aspects of different voting rules affect member states. Finally, it considers how the flawed voting system set out in the Nice Treaty could be repaired, enabling a respectable level of decision-making efficiency and almost no change to the power distribution agreed at Nice. |
主题 | Institutions |
URL | https://www.ceps.eu/publications/winners-and-losers-under-various-dual-majority-voting-rules-eus-council-ministers |
来源智库 | Centre for European Policy Studies (Belgium) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/62131 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Baldwin,Editor-in-Chief of Vox.eu.org,Mika Widgren. Winners and Losers under Various Dual-Majority Voting Rules for the EU's Council of Ministers. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
1116.pdf(507KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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