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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型论文
Tax competition and the efficiency of "benefit-related" business taxes
George Zodrow  
发表日期2019-03-21
出版年2019
语种英语
概述The authors construct a tax competition model in which local governments finance business public services with either a source-based tax ...
摘要By Elisabeth Gugl, Ph.D., and George R. Zodrow, Ph.D. The authors construct a tax competition model in which local governments finance business public services with either a source-based tax on mobile capital, such as a property tax, or a tax on production, such as an origin-based value added tax, and then assess which of the two tax instruments is more efficient.    
主题Center for Public Finance
URLhttps://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/tax-competition-and-efficiency-benefit-related/
来源智库James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/80541
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
George Zodrow  . Tax competition and the efficiency of "benefit-related" business taxes. 2019.
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